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ABSTRACT 
The decision of a venture capitalist to commit capital in a new risky business is a complex decision. 
Investors need to consider a number of important criteria simultaneously. Based on the postulates of 
signaling theory and the investment criteria outlined in the extant literature, we propose a theoretical 
framework to describe the relationship between a new venture’s characteristics and the funding decision. 
The proposed framework is tested using actual data of a unique sample of 200 new Egyptian technological 
startups. The startups were tracked from establishment until applying to a venture capitalist and a decision 
was made either to accept or to reject them. Logistic regression analysis reveals that venture capitalists 
prefer to invest in startups with mature products and actual financial performance. The entrepreneurs’ 
industry experience and the size of their social networks are important factors that affect the startup’s access 
to finance. Using decision tree analysis to map venture capitalists’ decisions, we show that the time of 
applying for funds is critical and serves as a gateway for further evaluation. Startups are more likely rejected 
for applying later into the venture capital fund than for lack of experience or unproved products. This 
suggests that the development of the Egyptian tech ecosystem may be hugely constrained by the limited 
availability of capital as well as the high aversion to risk on behalf of venture capitalists. 
 
Keywords: venture capital, selection criteria, tech startups, entrepreneurial finance, Egypt  
 
1. Introduction 
Venture capital is an important source of entrepreneurial finance. In addition to obtaining 
the needed funds to support their growth, startups also benefit from the venture capitalists’ business 
acumen, networks and various other valuable resources. Over the past forty years, the VC industry 
in the US has proved to be very efficient, creating a large number of very successful companies. 
This has led other countries around the world to copy the US VC model, although the emergent 
models are not without their own variations. Despite the widespread and growth of VC worldwide, 
the majority of new companies are often unsuccessful in getting funded by venture capitalists (VCs 
hereafter). 
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This has directed much research effort to identify how VCs select their investments. 
Empirical research revealed a number of important criteria that VCs use in the process of selecting 
their investments. clude market attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities 
(Chorev & Anderson, 2006; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), long-term growth and profitability of the 
industry (Hall & Hofer, 1993), preferences of VCs to invest earlier or later   
along a firm's life cycle (Gompers, 1997) as well as the probability of a successful exit (Tyebjee 
& Bruno, 1984).  
In Egypt, increased attention is being directed to promote innovation and entrepreneurial 
firms to promote economic conditions. Several proactive policies and programs are now in place 
to facilitate registering, establishing and development of new firms (Alsharif, 2015). Although the 
size of venture capital investments in Egyptian startups is increasing, little is known about how 
VCs make investment decisions and what characteristics do they look for in a new venture. By 
proposing and testing a theoretical framework that links criteria identified in the literature to the 
VC investment decision, the study contributes to the understanding and theorizing of venture 
capital decision-making in general, while also evaluating how the Egyptian environment could 
have shaped VC investment criteria.  
Venture capital decision-making has been extensively described in the literature by many 
researchers, nonetheless, it remains under-theorized (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). Numerous 
studies investigated the investment criteria that VC considered important in evaluating and 
selecting startups. Studies by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), MacMillan et al. (1985, 1987), Silva 
(2004), Zhang (2007) and Gompers et al. (2010) among others show that VCs investing in newly-
formed startups prioritize factors related to the entrepreneur/management team, factors related to 
the market potential followed by those related to the product/service offering. After this 'startup' 
stage, the evaluation of ventures in the 'early-growth' stage is more focused on financial aspects 
such as profit margins, costs of scalability of operations and exit possibilities. 
Despite the extensive research on VC selection and evaluation criteria, there is inconclusive 
evidence that these criteria will actually generate higher subsequent performance or superior 
growth for the new venture (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). Linking the criteria of VC funding 
and subsequent performance, however, is necessary for the development of theory. Petty and 
Gruber (2011) propose that this missing link is the result of the methodology used in prior research. 
Researchers first conducted surveys and interviews where venture capitalists were asked to rank 
different criteria according to their importance in shaping the investment decision (Sharma, 2015). 
Results showed that the characteristics of the entrepreneurial team, the characteristics of the 
product and the market opportunity were considered of top priority, followed by the financial 
aspects of the deal. However, these studies often contradicted as to which category ranked before 
the other. Results were also prone to self-reporting errors and post-hoc rationalization (Petty & 
Gruber, 2011) as well as recollection mistakes (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1999). In addition, VCs might have been more likely to report criteria that should be 
used rather than criteria they actually used (Nunes et al., 2014; Sharma, 2015).  
Other researchers used verbal protocols (Sandberg et al., 1988), where the real-time 
capturing and analysis of venture capitalists' decision processes allowed researchers to unravel the 
investment criteria that were actually 'in use'. Believed to be more accurate, these studies suggested 
that venture capitalists may ‘lack insight’ into their own decision-making (Shepherd, 1999; 
Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). However, verbal controls were not without their own limitations. 
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They were often limited to a smaller number of cases and were prone to the subjective 
interpretation of the researcher (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). The next wave of studies, which 
were experiment-like and used conjoint analysis, were criticized for having low validity, 
impracticality and oversimplification. The experiments focused on one stage of the decision-
making process as opposed to the dynamic settings in which VCs make investment decisions, 
therefore they provided an incomplete understanding of the investment criteria that were critical 
for venture capitalists (Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
  
2. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses development 
The role of signaling is established in the study of entrepreneurship. Evidence shows that 
the intensity and importance of a signal are positively related to the size of informational gaps that 
exist in the market. Entrepreneurial companies are characterized by huge uncertainty and high 
failure rates (Gompers et al., 2016). At the earlier stages, the company's assets are intangible and 
centered on the innovative ideas and skills of the entrepreneur. Before selecting their investments, 
venture capitalists typically expend great effort and time in gathering information to overcome 
informational gaps and to reduce opportunistic behavior as much as possible (Zacharakis & Meyer, 
1998).  
Signaling theory may explain why venture capitalists rely on the information they gather 
about entrepreneurs to predict whether a venture will be successful. It is a real challenge to identify 
competent management that would be able to generate high performance. Because of the 
uncertainty surrounding a new startup, at the time of assessment, venture capitalists rely on the 
observable attributes that are ‘presumably correlated to unobservable determinants of quality’ 
(Hoenig & Henkel, 2015). 
 
2.1 Criteria related to the quality of the entrepreneurial team 
MacMillan et al. (1985) show that the most important criteria to the venture capitalist are 
the entrepreneur's personality and experience. The study by Bhide (2000) showed that most 
successful entrepreneurial ideas came to founders while working with prominent past employers. 
According to Hsu (2007) and Zhang (2007), serial entrepreneurs not only have higher chances of 
being selected by venture capitalists but they also raise higher amounts of funding in their earlier 
rounds. Zhang (2007) explains that the superior performance of serial entrepreneurs may result 
from their ability to 'learn by doing' which enhances their entrepreneurial skills as well as the 
important connections that they have established in previous founding experiences particularly 
with VCs, and which may become beneficial in the future.  
Similarly, Gompers et al. (2016) show that the quality of management and management 
commitment are the criteria receiving the highest weight in the assessment of proposals and 
attribute the likelihood of investment success or failure to the entrepreneur rather than to the market 
or the business itself. Entrepreneurs' characteristics included among the highest valued criteria 
alternate between experience, skills, personality, enthusiasm and past entrepreneurial success 
(Gompers et al., 2010; Zhang, 2007; Silva, 2004). In the study by Bernstein et al. (2017) show that 
investors react most strongly to the information about a startup's founding team then to traction 
and prior investors. 
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Social capital and network relationships are important for entrepreneurs and may improve 
their chances of securing funding to their ventures. In uncertain environments, investors are more 
likely to place greater weight on the attributes of founders relative to other aspects of the business. 
When deciding to fund a startup or an early-stage venture, the quality of the entrepreneurial team 
is expected to be of critical importance for venture capitalists. However, venture capitalists cannot 
possibly judge new entrepreneurs using characteristics such as ‘integrity’, ‘passion’, ‘work ethics’ 
and ‘leadership' without actually entering into a working relationship with them. These criteria 
cannot be observed during decision-making. On the other hand, entrepreneur’s industry experience 
and education are objective measures. Likewise, the completeness of the team where important 
positions are filled is also objective. Therefore we formulate the following hypotheses about 
entrepreneurs using objective characteristics 
 
H 1: Entrepreneurs' characteristics are important criteria that affect venture capitalists' 
investment decision making. 
H 1.1: The quality of entrepreneur’s education has a positive effect on the funding decision 
H 1.2: Prior industry experience has a positive effect on the funding decision 
H 1.3: Diversity in the entrepreneurial teams' education/background have a positive effect on 
the funding decision 
H 1.4: The size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on the funding 
decision 
H 1.5: Entrepreneurs' commitment has a positive effect on the funding decision 
 
2.2 Criteria related to the product 
Despite the predominance of the criteria related to the entrepreneur in VC investment 
decision making (Gompers et al., 2016), those related to the product and to the market are found 
to be equally important, as witnessed by previous studies (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Rah et al., 1994). 
Other important criteria were related to the business proposition; whether the business is scalable 
and has high sustainable growth potential (Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2009), also those 
related to the product/service offering and the technology supporting the product; criteria related 
to the market potential and level of competition (Gompers et al., 2016), and criteria related to the 
developmental stage of the venture (Pries, 2001). Although part of the fame earned by US VC was 
because of their endorsement to some of the most innovative ideas and revolutionary technologies, 
in less developed, less stable economies VC may shy away from ventures with novel, untested 
products or innovative value propositions where the underlying technology is yet to be proved. 
Venture capitalists may prefer investing in ventures that already have had some success in the 
market or resemble others that proved to be successful, in other words, ventures that are 
commercially viable. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H 2: Product/service characteristics affect venture capitalists' investment decision making. 
H 2.1: Commercialized products (early validation) have a positive effect on the funding 
decision  
H 2.2: Products/services that resemble past successes have a positive effect on the funding 
decision  
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2.3 Criteria related to the market opportunity 
Studies also show that venture capitalists prefer to invest in tested products given there is 
still room for new market players. Several researchers provide evidence that market characteristics, 
such as the degree of competition and ease of entry are important investment criteria for venture 
capitalists (Gompers et al., 2016; Nunes et al., 2014; Simic, 2015). Their logic is obvious; for VCs 
to ascertain handsome returns on their investment, a venture needs to compete in a large and a 
growing market (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Nunes et al., 2014; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Simic, 2015). 
In addition, the presence of a developed customer base proves that the startup is accepted in the 
market. We test whether the growth rate of the target market and an existing proof of market 
acceptance are important criteria for VC. 
 
H 3: Market characteristics are important criteria that affect venture capitalists' investment 
decision making. 
H 3.1: Higher growth in the startup target market has a positive effect on the funding decision 
H 3.2: Proof of market acceptance has a positive effect on the funding decision 
 
2.4 Availability of financial information 
Venture capitalists take into consideration a large amount of intangible and subjective 
information about early stage startups (Armandi, 2015; Gompers et al., 2016; Sharma, 2015; 
Wright & Robbie, 1998). For obvious reasons, financial information about the new venture is 
greatly lacking. The high degree of uncertainty often leads to a wide discrepancy between 
entrepreneurs' own financial projections, VC projections and subsequent actual performance. 
Forecasting then discounting cash flows is extremely difficult when a venture has not yet generated 
profits or revenues, and would lead to inaccurate estimates of a startup true value (Gompers et al., 
2016). Nonetheless, if available, financial information help VCs greatly when making evaluations 
of a potential investment (kohn, 2018). Venture capitalists prefer to base their projections on actual 
revenues and cash flows rather than depend on the projections supplied by entrepreneurs that are 
not based on actual data. 
 
H 4: Disclosure of positive revenues has a positive effect on the funding decision.  
 
 
2.5 The Relationship between VC and Prior Investors 
Angel investors fund startups at the very early stages of development. Angels are typically 
former entrepreneurs who provide much needed expertise and post-investment mentoring to 
nascent companies, although the size of their investment is relatively smaller than that of VC 
(Mason & Harrison, 1996; Wiltbank et al., 2009). Researchers suggest that investment decision-
making of angel investors and venture capitalists might be similar, however, the relationship 
between them with regard to a single investment remains under-researched. Mason and Stark 
(2004) suggest that angel investors' experience, hands-on management, active coaching and other 
value-adding activities can reduce moral hazard and elicit a relationship of trust. The study by 
Wong et al. (2009) reveals that the roles of angel investors and venture capitalists complement 
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each other. The study also shows that professional networks of angel investors can help 
entrepreneurs access VC funds faster.  
In emerging markets, the relationship between angel investors and venture capitalists is 
less clear. Little is known on whether prior funding by angel investors is regarded positively by 
the venture capitalist. A co-investment strategy between angels and venture capitalists may, in 
theory, help reduce the severity of economic and market conditions through spreading the risks 
(Scheela et al., 2015). While the involvement of one angel investor may be observed as a good 
signal, receiving many rounds of seed funding may not. The presence of more investors means 
that the new startup has relinquished a larger portion of its equity (Ibrahim, 2013). This can deter 
venture capitalists from investing because returns of all investors will be reduced. Based on the 
previous argument, to test whether prior investments affect the VC's decision to fund a new startup, 
the following are hypothesized: 
 
H 5: Involvement of prior investors has a positive effect on the funding decision 
 
2.6 The Role of VC Experience and Stage of the VC Fund in Startup Selection 
A number of studies have examined the effect of VC-specific factors on the VC decision-
making process (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2000; Mishra et al., 2017; Rakhman & Evans, 2005). 
However, there are inconclusive evidence on how VC-specific factors impact venture selection. 
The venture capitalist industry experience and educational background are among the most 
researched factors. Gompers et al. (2008) study VC cycles and show that experienced venture 
capitalists are more sensitive to favorable public market signals and respond by increasing their 
investments more readily than venture capitalists with less experience and those experienced in 
different industries. Franke et al. (2008) find differences in the ranking of investment criteria 
between more and less experienced venture capitalists. Whether a match between the industry 
expertise of the VC and the industry of the new startup actually affected the final funding decision 
was not examined.  
More recently, Cox et al. (2017) suggest that an 'investment paradox' exists when 
fundamental criteria about the team, the product and the market are met but investors are still 
unwilling to invest in a new venture. They show that the relationship between the business angels' 
criteria and the overall investment potential of a new venture is moderated by the business angels' 
industry experience. The present study tests the hypotheses that a fit between VC-related factors 
and a new investment actually moderates the relationship between the fundamental criteria and the 
decision to invest. Possessing the relevant industry experience can help investors evaluate the 
entrepreneur's capabilities more accurately, communicate better with the venture's management 
team and eventually add more value to the new venture. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
 
H 6: VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship between the startup 
characteristics and the funding decision 
 
In addition to VC industry experience, characteristics of the VC fund can determine 
whether a specific investment will be accepted or rejected by the venture capitalist. A good 
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investment opportunity may still be rejected for a number of reasons including a misalignment 
with the VC fund strategy or with the fund remaining life. A venture capitalist with a strategy to 
diversify across industries may select different investments to a venture capitalist that wants to 
create synergistic value between portfolio companies. In addition, VC investments are eventually 
cashed out/liquidated to provide returns to LPs. Therefore upon approaching the end life of the 
fund, VC may seek quicker profits and are more likely to invest in the fewer ventures that can be 
exited from quickly. Startups requiring a longer time frame to achieve a successful exit will be 
rejected regardless of management quality and the attractiveness of products and/or markets. This 
means that startups have higher chances of getting funded around the beginning of a new VC fund.  
 
H 7: The VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup 
characteristics and the funding decision 
 
The hypotheses stated above test some of the already examined relationships in previous 
studies. However, instead of relying on the ratings of the venture capitalists themselves that were 
provided in surveys and interviews or extracted from venture capitalists’ executive summaries, the 
present study reformulated these relationships as hypotheses to be tested using actual data about 
startups’ entrepreneurs, products/services and markets. Similar hypotheses were tested to predict 
subsequent venture (financial) performance (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015), to distinguish high-
flyer exits from non-high-flyer exits (Streletzki & Schulte, 2013) but not to predict the funding 
decision which is examined here.  
In previous studies, researchers used criteria such as the expected rate of return, size of the 
investment, exit opportunities, among others to investigate the importance of the financial aspects 
of the deal. We test the relationship between the disclosure of positive revenues and the funding 
decision (H4) to reflect a number of attributes about the startup. First, the degree of uncertainty 
about the startup is reduced and venture capitalists could base their evaluations on more reliable 
information. Second, the stage of the startup is accounted for to show whether the venture capitalist 
supplying the first round is more inclined to select post-revenue startups. This may reflect a higher 
degree of risk aversion for venture capitalists investing in Egypt. By proposing that characteristics 
of the venture capital fund moderate the relationship between the characteristics of a startup and 
the final funding decision (H6 and H7), we build on the findings of Petty and Gruber (2011) who 
reported that fund-related characteristics, such as ‘inappropriate timing’, ‘no remaining fund for 
region’, and ‘competition with existing portfolio’ were basis for deal rejection.  
Drawing on multiple theoretical relationships, the proposed framework (Figure 1) 
combines the important criteria outlined in the literature to represent a unique view to venture 
capital decision making as a complex process. Further research could test the relevance of different 
sub-criteria according to the context. 
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Figure 1  A framework to explain the relationship between VC Investment Criteria, VC 
Characteristics and the Funding Decision 
 
3. Method and data collection 
One of the main contributions of the present study is that it overcomes the limitations of 
prior works by employing a different approach to study venture capitalists’ investment decisions. 
Instead of interviewing venture capitalists, the actual data about 200 Egyptian startup ventures, 
their entrepreneurial teams, products and markets were collected and analyzed. The convenience 
sampling approach was used1 and the information about the startups were hand-collected from a 
variety of sources. Information about new startup founding and VC and angel funding were 
obtained from the websites of CrunchBase, AngelList, and Startup Ranking as well as from news 
clips, business articles, and the websites of venture capial firms.  
Information about entrepreneurs' education and experience were obtained from LinkedIn. 
Reports published by MENA Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and the electronic 
 
1 Although randomness would have been preferable in order to render conclusions more generalizable, the sample constituted one 
third of the startups listed on AngelList (around 620 startups) by end of 2018. 
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portals of Magnitt and VCAfrica were used to gather information about the availability of VC 
funds and the investments that took place each year. Special attention was given to include only 
startups for which all the needed information is available and verifiable. Startups with missing 
information were replaced. Each company was tracked from the year it was established, through 
important events and activities until the end of 2018. The startups were established between 2004 
and 2017. Table 1 shows the industry and age of startups in the sample.  
 
Table 1 Number and age of startups by industry 
 
 
Startups classified by type of seed funding received prior to applying to obtain VC funds 
are shown in Table 2. All percentages are calculated for the total sample (N=200). A relatively 
higher percentage of VC-funded startups had no prior investors followed by those which attended 
acceleration/incubation programs. Out of the sampled 200 startups, 64 startups (32.5%) received 
VC-backing, 19 startups (9.5%) received angel investments whether solely or in addition to being 
accelerator-backed. Similarly a total of 105 startups (52.5%) received investments from 
accelerators/incubators, 10 of which (5%) have also received angel investments. A very small 
number of startups received grants or financial prizes through the participation in startup events. 
The awarded sums of money in such events are often miniscule compared to what is needed to 
start a business. In addition, founders would need to invest their own funds initially to build a 
working prototype in order to compete in such events.  
The frequencies and percentages of important characteristics observed in the sample are 
shown in Table 3. Each of these characteristics is represented by a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the characteristic is observed in the startup, and zero if it is not observed. Percentages 
are calculated based on the column total. A larger difference between the two groups exists for 
industry experience, and possessing a ready product, as well as generating revenues. Endorsement 
is the only variable that was observed more in the non VC-funded group. The majority of startups 
in the sample had committed teams (71%) and products which had some initial level of market 
Industry Classification Total VC- Funded Av. Age (yrs) 
Advertising & Marketing 8 0 7.71 
Agribusiness 4 1 5.68 
Business Services & Enterprise Software 10 2 6.16 
Consumer Services 8 2 4.12 
Delivery & Logistics 3 1 3.70 
E-commerce 34 16 5.59 
Education 12 3 3.94 
Energy & Clean tech 5 2 6.25 
Financial services 15 7 4.47 
Healthcare 14 5 4.77 
HR & Recruitment 5 2 6.52 
Manufacturing (B2B) 1 1 6.28 
Media & Entertainment 12 4 5.89 
Network & Community 16 2 5.96 
Real Estate 2 2 5.74 
Transportation 10 4 4.95 
Technology & IT solutions 37 10 5.05 
Travel & Tourism 4 0 5.41 
Total 200 64 5.20 
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Table 2 Type of Seed Funding Received Prior VC 
 
 
Table 3 Frequency of Observing Important Characteristics in the Sample  
  
4. Variables and measurement 
The following section describes the variables of the study and explains how they are 
measured. 
 
2 Foreign education received in Egypt or abroad is regarded as superior to the national education. According to the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor ‘GEM Egypt report 2012, the national education system is one of the major constraining factors to the 
development of entrepreneurial ecosystem in Egypt. 
 Type of Seed Funding VC-funded Non VC- funded Total 
Accelerator/Incubator-backed 21 (10.5%) 74 (37%) 95 (47.5%) 
Angel investors only 3 (1.5%) 6 (3%) 9 (4.5%) 
Accelerator & Angel investors 5 (2.5%) 5 (2.5%) 10 (5%) 
Grants/prize Only 3 (1.5%) 12 (6%) 15 (7.5%) 
None 32 (16%) 39 (19.5%) 71 (35.5%) 
 VC-funded 
N=64 




Education (Foreign) 37 (58%) 67 (49%) 104 (52%) 
Industry Experience 46 (72%) 31 (23%) 77 (39%) 
Team (Diversity) 33 (52%) 55 (40%) 88 (44%) 
Commitment 57 (89%) 85 (63%) 142 (71%) 
Past Success 39 (61%) 62 (46%) 101 (51%) 
Product Stage  47 (73%) 28 (21%) 75 (38%) 
Market Growth (High) 33 (52%) 53 (39%) 86 (43%) 
Market Acceptance 59 (92%) 86 (63%) 145 (73%) 
Revenue 52 (81%) 43 (32%) 95 (48%) 
Endorsement 29 (45%) 85 (63%) 114 (57%) 
Engagement (average) 3.28 2.49 2.74 




1- Characteristics of the Entrepreneurial Team 
 
1.1  Education 
 
Type of education received by the lead 
entrepreneur(s).    
 
Dichotomous  Variable 
1= foreign / 
international education2 
0 = otherwise 
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3 Only time commitment was included in the analysis. Almost all founders in the sample used their own funds (or funds of family 
and friends) at some time during startup establishment, therefore financial commitment was not considered. 
4 A startup is often in continuous need of funding along a series of processes where it first develops a prototype, then tests a product, 
then enters a pre-production stage to test the market, eventually producing and selling a successful product. The venture capitalist 
may choose to wait until a product reaches a certain stage before investing.  
5 First the actual market growth rates were obtained from official industry reports produced by Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology (MCIT) or (General Authority for Investment & Free Zones) GAFI. However, these growth rates 
apparently lacked consistency. Therefore another measurement for market growth is used; the ranking of markets based on the 
growth in the yearly number of VC deals made by MENA investors. These rankings were obtained from reports issued by the 
MENA Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and had the same way of calculation each year. Higher-growth markets 
included Fintech, E-commerce, Delivery & logistics, Transportation, Technology & IT solutions, Education, Health care and 
Consumer services. Lower-growth markets included Advertising & marketing, Agribusiness, Business services, Energy & clean 





Entrepreneurs possess  
- Industry experience if they have worked for a 
company in the same industry for at least 5 years 
 
Dichotomous  Variable 
1= previous experience  





Whether members of the entrepreneurial team 
have different backgrounds representing 
important functional areas e.g. production, 
marketing/sales, etc. 
 
Dichotomous  Variable 
1 = diverse background 





Entrepreneur devotes entire time to the startup 
(e.g. does not hold other jobs at overlapping dates 
with the startup establishment or quit original job 
to establish startup).3 
 
Dichotomous  Variable 
1 = committed 
0 = not committed 
 




The number of startup events and engagements in 
which the startup has participated prior to the 










Marking the developmental stage of the startup's 
product at the time of application for funds.4  
Products are divided into fully developed products 
that are ready to be commercialized and products 
that still need further development  
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1 = fully developed 






Whether the product resembles another that is a 
proven past success or is completely new  
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1 = past success 
0 = new 
 





The growth in the startup primary market 
indicates how promising the business opportunity 




1 = high growth 
0 = low growth 
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6 Experience of the venture capitalist came from prior investments made in the same industry as that of the startup being evaluated. 
 
3.2 Market  
Acceptance 
 
An existing customer base indicates a startup is 
already accepted in the market (market validation)  
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1= customer base 
developed 
0 = no Customer base 
 




Dividing startups according to whether they 
generated positive or negative revenues at the time 
of applying for VC funding  
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1= generating positive 
revenues  
0= zero or negative 
revenues 
 







- Whether a startup has received a prior round of 
seed investment (measured as a binary variable in 
the logistic regression). 
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1 = received funding 
from a prior investor 









Whether the venture capitalist has prior 
experience in the industry of the startup6 
 
Dichotomous Variable 
1= VC experienced in  
the startup industry 
0 = VC not experienced 
in the startup industry  
 




The stage of the VC fund at the time of the startup 
evaluation  
 
Number of years that 
passed from the start of 













1= startup funded 
(selection) 
0= startup not funded 
(rejection) 
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5. Analysis and Results 
Logistic regression was used to test the effect of the investment criteria on the funding 
decision. Three models are tested and the results are shown in Table 4. Model 1 included eleven 
independent variables with no interaction effects: education, industry experience, team, 
commitment, engagement, ready product, past success, market acceptance, market growth, 
revenues, and endorsement. The estimated coefficients of the variables, standard errors and odds 
ratio are presented. The likelihood ratio for the joint significance of the explanatory variables is 
estimated using the chi-square test, where x2 is 114.055, p-value ≤ 0.01. The variables: industry 
experience, engagement, ready product, market growth, and revenue have significant coefficients 
(p-value ≤ 0.05). 
In the second and third runs of the LR (model 2 and model 3), in addition to main effects, 
the moderation effects of ‘VC experience’ and ‘time into VC fund’ are tested by adding interaction 
terms which combine these moderating factors with the independent variables. The two models 
are statistically significant, but none of the coefficients of the interaction terms are of statistical 
significance. This indicates that there are no combined effects for the variables included in the 
interaction terms, however, VC experience and time into fund are significant independently and 
are thus important on their own, not through their interaction components. Thus we reject 
hypothesis 6 which states that VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship 
between the startup characteristics and the investment decision and also reject hypothesis 7 which 
states that the VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup 
characteristics and the investment decision. 
When testing the moderation of VC experience (model 2) and time into fund (model 3), 
the models were liable to over-fitting, as the variables were augmented with the interaction terms 
and might have caused the interaction terms to have insignificant coefficients. After eliminating 
interaction terms, another LR is run (model 4) using ‘VC experience’ and ‘time into fund’ as 
independent variables, in addition to the independent variables from model 1. Results are shown 
in Table 5. The Nagelkerke R-square ranges from 0 to 1 and approximates how much variation in 
the outcome is explained by the variables in the model (Field, 2008). It also gives an indication on 
the predictive power of the LR. Model 4 explains approximately 76% of the funding decision and 
therefore it does relatively well in explaining which startups receive funding. There are five 
variables in the model that significantly influence whether a startup gets VC funding or not. The 
variables with the statistically significant effect are industry experience, ready product, revenue, 
engagement and time into fund.  
For the categorical variables, the table shows the β coefficient of industry experience is 
positive (2.267) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that possessing industry experience is 
associated with increased odds of achieving funding. The odds ratio (OR) show that entrepreneurs 
with industry experience are almost 10 times more likely (9.651 times) to get funded than their 
unexperienced counterparts. Therefore hypothesis 1.2 that states prior industry experience has a 
positive effect on the funding decision is accepted. Ready product is another important factor. Its 
coefficient is positive (1.615) and significant at the 5% level. Its OR indicates that startups with 
ready products are 5 times more likely to get funded than startups whose products are still 
undeveloped. Therefore hypothesis 2.1 which states that commercially viable products/services 
have a positive effect on the funding decision is accepted.  
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Table 4 Logistic regression results before and after introducing moderator variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable/ Main effects β S.E OR β S.E OR β S.E OR 
 Intercept -7.22*** 1.336 .001 -2.635*** 1.1859 .072 -13.344* 5.1914 1.602E-6 
 Education -.031 .461 .969 .238 .6846 1.268 1.665 3.1518 5.287 
  Industry Experience 2.223*** .450 9.232 2.754*** .7969 15.700 6.651** 2.8458 773.187 
 Team -1.61 .448 .852 .278 .6936 1.320 4.931* 2.8118 138.503 
 Commitment .275 .622 1.317 -.307 1.0653 .736 -3.182 4.3927 .041 
 Engagement .154** .072 1.167 -.177** .0947 .838 -.644 .6643 .525 
 Ready Product  2.038*** .4789 7.677 1.867*** .8278 6.469 3.118 3.6110 22.601 
 Past Success .741* .455 2.099 1.074** .7322 2.928 -.050 3.2416 .951 
 Market Growth .659** .330 1.933 -.647*** .6584 .524 -.892 3.0053 .410 
 Market Acceptance .066 .710 1.068 .225 .8958 1.253 -1.329 3.4808 .265 
 Revenue .1.182** .538 3.261 2.031** .7765 7.620 3.366 3.1238 28.971 
 Endorsement -.681 .476 .506 -.276 .7947 .759 -1.772 2.7327 .170 
Interaction Effects          
 VC Exp    .066*** 1.8475 1.068    
 VC Exp * Education    -.802 1.0934 .448    
 VC Exp * Industry Experience    .255 1.1816 1.290    
 VC Exp * Team    -.140 1.0653 .870    
 VC Exp * Commitment    1.843 1.6608 6.319    
 VC Exp * Engagement    .001 .1363 1.001    
 VC Exp * Ready Product    .591 1.0877 1.805    
 VC Exp * Past Success    .090 1.0462 1.095    
 VC Exp * Market Growth    1.700* 1.1000 5.477    
 VC Exp * Market Acceptance    1.108 1.7434 3.030    
 VC Exp * Revenue    -1.889* 1.0840 .151    
 VC Exp * Endorsement    -.660 1.1090 .517    
 Time into Fund       4.717** 1.9048 111.824 
 Time into Fund * Education       -.563 1.2078 .053 
 Time into Fund * Industry Experience       -1.373 .9882 .253 
 Time into Fund * Team       -2.567* 1.1830 .077 
 Time into Fund * Commitment       1.161 1.8018 3.192 
 Time into Fund * Engagement       .130 .2368 1.139 
 Time into Fund * Ready Product       .010 1.3943 1.010 
 Time into Fund * Past Success       .267 1.3226 .098 
 Time into Fund * Market  Growth       -1.069 1.2468 .343 
 Time into Fund * Market Acceptance       .320 1.3005 .108 
 Time into Fund * Revenue       -.637 1.1531 .529 
 Time into Fund * Endorsement       .192 .9954 1.212 
Omnibus test          
 Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 114.055*** 135.438*** 174.700*** 
Goodness of Fit    
 Log Likelihood -68.346 -57.655 -38.024 
 Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 162.693 167.310 128.047 
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Level of significance:   *: p ≤ 0.1;      **: p ≤ 0.05;    ***: p ≤ 0.01 
 
Revenues is also positive (1.323) and significant at the 5% level and OR indicates that 
revenue generation increases the likelihood of getting funded by 3.755 times. Hence we accept 
hypothesis 4 which states that the availability of financial information has a positive effect on the 
funding decision. 
In Model 4, two continuous variables are significant; engagement and time into fund. The 
coefficient of engagement is positive and significant, although very small (0.189). The OR 
indicates that for every one-unit increase in engagement, we expect a 1.2 increase in the log-odds 
of getting funded, holding all other independent variables constant. Accordingly, we accept 
hypothesis 1.5 that states that the size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on 
the funding decision. In contrast, time into fund has a negative β coefficient (-2.144) and 
significant at the 1% level. The OR indicates that for every one-unit increase in VC fund maturity, 
the log-odds of a startup getting selected by VC drops by 0.117. 
 
Table 5  Logistic regression results with main effects only 
 
 Model 4 
Variable/ Main effects β S.E OR 
 Intercept -2.085 1.787 .124 
 Education .058 .603 1.060 
 Industry Experience 2.267*** .606 9.651 
 Team -.940 .605 .390 
 Commitment .056 .747 1.058 
 Engagement .189** .092 1.209 
 Ready Product  1.615** .633 5.030 
 Past Success .616 .594 1.851 
 Market Growth .727 .474 2.069 
 Market Acceptance -.0236 .825 .790 
 Revenue 1.323** .743 3.755 
 Endorsement -.880 .605 .415 
 VC Experience .455 .588 1.576 
 Time into Fund -2.144*** .423 .117 
Omnibus test    
 Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 157.790*** 
Goodness of Fit  
 Log Likelihood -46.479 
 Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 120.957 
Cox & Snell R Square .546 
Nagelkerke R Square .764 
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The following table summarizes the results of the hypothesis testing  
H 1.1  The quality of entrepreneur’s education has a positive effect on the funding 
decision 
Rejected 
H 1.2  Prior industry experience has a positive effect on the funding decision Accepted 
H 1.3  Diversity in the entrepreneurial teams' background has a positive effect on the 
funding decision 
Rejected 
H 1.4  Entrepreneurs' commitment has a positive effect on the funding decision Rejected 
H 1.5  The size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on the funding 
decision  
Accepted 
H 2.1  A commercialized product (early validation) has a positive effect on the funding 
decision  
Accepted 
H 2.2  A product that resembles past successes have a positive effect on the funding 
decision 
Rejected 
H 3.1  Higher growth in the startup target market has a positive effect on the funding 
decision 
Rejected 
H 3.2  Proof of market acceptance has a positive effect on the funding decision Rejected 
H 4  Disclosure of positive revenues has a positive effect on the funding decision.  Accepted 
H 5  Involvement of prior investors has a positive effect on the funding decision Rejected 
H 6  VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship between the startup 
characteristics and the funding decision 
Rejected 
H 7  The VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup 




The quality of the entrepreneur was found to be more important than all other factors to the 
VC decision. Such finding is in line with the majority of the previous studies. The first of these 
studies and perhaps the most cited is the one by MacMillian et al. (1985), who stated that ‘above 
all other criteria, it is the entrepreneur’s quality that ultimately determines the investment 
decision’. However, not all aspects of quality are of the same importance to the venture capitalist 
investing in Egyptian tech startups. Venture capitalists invested in startups whose entrepreneurs 
were experienced and had a track record in the industry. This finding was also documented by 
Shepherd (1999), Franke et al. (2008) and Flynn (1991). The present study showed that neither 
commitment nor diversity of the entrepreneurial team were found to be statistically significant in 
shaping the funding decision. In addition, investors seemed to take less into their account the type 
of education of the entrepreneurial team.  
The diversity in the entrepreneurial teams’ background/education was not found to be of 
sizeable significance. In fact, a large number of the startups that got funded had teams with the 
 
7 The VC fund maturity acted as an independent variable rather than a moderating variable. All interaction effects with the model’s 
main independent variables (criteria) have insignificant coefficients. The absence of moderation was the basis for rejecting the 
hypothesis. 
 
THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE  VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (WINTER 2019) 1-25 
 
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *  
 
17 
same background and some had only one entrepreneur. In previous studies, production/process, 
marketing/sales and financial/accounting capabilities of the team did not rank as high as other 
aspects of the entrepreneurial team (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; Mishra et al., 
2017). A plausible explanation is that various business functions could now be outsourced to 
professionals who work independently from the startup. With of growth of networks connecting 
entrepreneurs and the spread of freelancing, functions such as advertising and marketing 
campaigns could be easily commissioned at a relatively low cost. Alternatively, as the startup 
grows, entrepreneurial teams could hire employees to carry out marketing, product design and 
finance but without making them partners.   
In line with findings of Zhang (2007), the size of the social network of the startup was 
found to be important in shaping VC decisions. Entrepreneurs of funded startups had a higher level 
of engagement in local and international startup events and competitions. Such events give a 
positive signal on the quality of startup and bring entrepreneurs in contact with a wide network of 
potential investors, business partners and support entities including accelerators and incubators. 
These events also get considerable media coverage which can greatly help entrepreneurs in 
accessing funds.  
The study also revealed that startups whose products were fully developed and then tested 
in the market had higher chances of getting funded than startups with prototypes or partially 
developed products. With a ready or commercialized product, uncertainty is decreased and the 
informational gaps are reduced and venture capitalists have a preliminary idea on what the business 
is worth. This finding is in line with Amit et al. (1998) and Gupta and Sapienza (1992). In more 
developed VC markets, however, the abundance of capital might be used more readily to back 
promising business ideas. The scarcity of funds in the Egyptian VC market may cause investors to 
be more careful with their money that they choose startups already showing some level of success 
with their products. While this does not spur innovations by allowing ambitious entrepreneurs to 
experiment and err with their ideas, it helps to weed out unsuccessful endeavors quickly. VCs were 
not particularly keen to invest in startups that are similar to others that had succeeded in other parts 
of the region. Investors fund startups with unique products/services as well as those resembling 
past successes. While a previously proven business model may reduce the failure risks to investors, 
a working product may mitigate such risks. 
In contrast to previous research, market-related characteristics were not as important as the 
other factors. This finding could be caused by a mismatch between a startup’s identified market 
and the actual market it serves or the inaccuracy of the reported growth rates. To assume that 
market growth is unimportant will be highly illogical, therefore alternative market characteristics 
should be tested. The literature presents other reasons that could explain this finding. The flow of 
VC funds is sometimes slow to react to changes in the market (Gompers et al., 2008). Alternatively, 
VC activity may increase in slow growing markets that are on the verge of change. Competent 
investors identify opportunities in untapped markets (low growth) that no one expects to be 
profitable or can see that an industry is transforming and invest their money and time in it.  
The study also shows that startups that have endured the earlier stages of development and 
are generating positive cash flows have higher chances of getting funded by venture capitalists. 
This finding is similar to that of Gompers (1997) and Dimov et al. (2007) who concluded that VC 
prefer investment in companies at the revenue generation stage as investment risk is greatly 
reduced. Although entrepreneurs communicate financial projections to investors through business 
plans to show the potential of their startups, it helps a great deal when the financial projections are 
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based on real financial performance. While early projections cannot be very accurate, they serve 
as a quality signal that the startup’s product is successful and is a proof that a customer base is 
already forming. Hence knowing the financial aspects can positively affect the VC evaluation of a 
startup potential investment. Unfortunately, technology-based startups normally incur huge 
upfront running and developmental costs, which means that early financial strains may decrease 
the chances of getting funded by VC, ultimately jeopardizing the startups’ survival.  
The presence of a prior investor did not affect the funding decision of the venture capitalist. 
A number of reasons may account for this finding. The early investors operating in Egypt may still 
lack the level of experience and accomplishment that would send a quality signal about the startups 
they are backing. Alternatively venture capitalists may not be willing to share their returns with 
others or fear getting tangled in contracts involving prior investors.  
The study also reveals that the fund maturity is very important in determining whether a 
startup will be selected. VCs closed the majority of their deals during the first two years after 
capital had been pooled into the VC fund. After that, startups’ chances drop dramatically. The 
effect of fund maturity is pronounced because of the limited number of funds raised. Upon 
approaching the maturity of a fund, venture capitalists are more likely to make follow-on 
investments in their portfolio rather than enter into new investments. On the other hand, the 
industry experience of a venture capitalist did not affect the funding decision in a significant 
manner. While seemingly odd, the VC market is still underdeveloped and most investors in our 
sample did not have experience in the industry of the startups they invested in. The irrelevance of 
industry experience was probably mitigated by the formation of syndicates and investing in mature 
products as well as revenue-generating companies. 
 
7. Capturing the interactions between Criteria 
To capture the interactions between criteria, we model VC decisions using decision trees. 
Decision trees are very interpretable and create very good explanations of the data in the form of 
if-then-else decisions as well as allow visualization of the data (Hastie et al., 2009). They also rank 
features (characteristics) according to their importance in affecting the outcome, in this case the 
investment decision. Decision trees can also capture interactions (non-linear relationships) 
between features as the tree splits differently on different inputs. Linear regression and logistic 
regression models fail in situations where the relationship between features and output is nonlinear 
or where features interact with each other. To draw the tree structure, IBM SPSS model was used. 
All 200 records were fed into the model for training, with the following configuration: max tree 
depth=5, minimum records to split a parent node: 20 (10% of data) and the minimum records in a 
child node: 10 (5% of data). 
The root of the tree contains all 200 observations in the dataset. As shown in Figure 2, the 
most important factor in determining whether a VC will finance a new startup is time into the VC 
fund, and is used as the first decision rule to split the data. Time into the VC fund was previously 
tested as a moderator variable, however, the decision tree confirms the results of LR in that the 
time at which startups apply to the VC fund is of fundamental importance. From the illustration of 
the decision tree, 125 startups had time into the fund > 2.5 years8, 112 were rejected (89.6%) and 
only 13 startups were accepted (10.4%). Node 2 is said to be a pure node because it provided a 
decision rule that split the data into roughly 90%-10% groups. This ratio means that we are 90% 
 
8 Mean of the variable ‘time into VC fund’ calculated by the decision tree algorithm. 
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confident that startups which apply after 2.5 years into the fund will be rejected. Out of a total of 
136 rejected startups, this represents a rejection rate of 82.4% based on fund maturity alone. Along 
the path time into the fund > 2.5 years, the tree further splits the data based on product stage.9 The 
number of startups with undeveloped product were 94 startups. Only 3 startups (3%) were funded 
and 91 startups (97%) were rejected. This leads to a high degree of confidence in the rejection of 
startups that have undeveloped product given that they applied more than 2.5 years into the VC 
fund.  
Alternatively, out of 75 startups with time into the fund ≤ 2.5 years, 24 startups (32%) were 
rejected and 51 startups (68%) were accepted. Node 1 is less pure and another split is made. A 
decision rule based on industry experience is applied to the data (75 startups). Node 3 shows that 
out of 31 startups with no industry experience, 17 startups (54.8%) were rejected and 14 (45.2%) 
were accepted. Industry experience along this path resulted in a 50%-50% split of the data and the 
node is said to be very impure. The tree applies a decision rule based on product stage. Along the 
same path IndExp =0 (a total of 31 startups), for product stage =1 or 2, all 12 startups were rejected 
(100%). For product stage =3 (a total of 19 startups), 5 startups (26.3%) were rejected and 14 
startups (73.7%) are accepted. Along the path IndExp =1 (a total of 44 startups), 7 startups (16%) 
were rejected and 37 startups (84%) were accepted (node 4). The tree then applied a decision rule 
based on revenues. Along the same path IndExp =1, the number of startups with no revenues was 
12 startups, of which 5 startups (42%) were rejected and 7 startups (58%) were accepted.  
For revenue =1 (32 startups), 2 startups (6%) were rejected and 30 startups (94%) were 
accepted. Node 10 is a highly pure node. When the number of startups become small, further splits 
will cause over-fitting and the applied decision rules will be particular to specific cases and cannot 
be generalized to other datasets.  
As can be observed in Figure 3, the decision tree ranked the decision rules learnt from the data, 
according to their importance and improvement contributed to the whole model, as follows: 1- 
time into the VC fund, 2- product stage, 3- industry experience and 4- revenues. Another 
important advantage of the decision tree is capturing interactions between decision rules. For 
example if time into fund ≤ 2.5 years the entrepreneur has experience but no revenues, the 
chances to get funded drops from 15% (30/200) to 3.5% (7/200). If the entrepreneur does not 
have experience and the product is still being developed, the chances to get funded is almost 
nonexistent even if he or she applied within 2.5 years from the start of the VC fund. Startups 
applying after this window have a higher chance to get funded if their products are 
commercialized.
 
9 ‘Product stage’ is an ordinal variable alternative to the dichotomous ‘ready product’ where 1= prototype, 2=untested but viable 
product and 3=commercialized product. The split by the decision tree indicates similar results to the LR analysis. 
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Figure 2   Illustration of VC decision rules using decision tree
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Modeling the data using decision trees provided useful insights into how the independent 
variables may interact together. Results showed that a higher rejection rate was attributed to 
startups’ applying later into the VC fund than there was acceptance for those applying earlier. By 
applying later, about 90% of startups were rejected in contrast, a startup applying in the first few 
years was twice as likely to get funded, depending on its other characteristics. Because VCs seem 
to make deals in the first years of the fund, the time into the VC fund, serves as the gateway for 
further evaluation. This shows that the limited capital available for investment is a huge constraint 
to the startup ecosystem. Next in importance is the product stage followed by industry experience. 
Specifically, undeveloped products were often reason to reject a startup. However, not possessing 
industry experience was not enough reason for rejection. A startup could still be considered for 
funding, provided its product was fully developed. This reflects that, for a VC, a ready product 
preceded experience. The faster products are brought to market, the faster a startup generates 
revenue thus reducing the risk of investment to the VC. Unquestionably, the absence of industry 
knowledge combined with an underdeveloped product guarantees that a startup will be rejected. 
The availability of financial information about the startup were considered next in importance. 
Startups that generated positive revenues, given they were not rejected for the previous three 
criteria, have 35% higher chances to get funded. The availability of financial information means 
that VCs can evaluate a startup more accurately.   
 
 
Figure 3 Ranking of decision criteria according to decision tree analysis 
 
8. Conclusion 
The study shows that the decision to fund a new startup is mainly shaped by the 
entrepreneur’s industry experience, product stage, revenues, time of applying to the VC fund, and 
the size of the entrepreneur’s social network. Using decision trees to map VC decisions reveal that 
the time of application to the VC fund serves as a gateway for further evaluation. Although 
interwoven together, the stage of the product precedes the entrepreneur’s industry experience and 
the availability of financial information in importance. Similar to the time of application, the 
product stage is an important factor in startup rejection.  
The study has important practical implications for entrepreneurs. Developing the product 
and bringing it to market as fast as possible should be their first concern. Entrepreneurs should 
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also work on cultivating business connections and engage in local and international startup events 
to gain traction for their startups. Unfortunately, deciding when to apply is critical and the chances 
of getting funded are greatly constrained by the limited number of VC funds. In a relatively young 
ecosystem like the Egyptian venture capital market, VC-related characteristics are bound to play 
an important role in shaping final funding outcomes. Venture capitalists, being focused on actual 
performance metrics, tend to choose attractive startups with low business and market risk. While 
the present study builds on and adds to previous work on VC investment criteria, the inability to 
access deal-related data and other ‘sensitive’ financial information, such as VC returns and startup 
valuations, restricted the number of variables under study. The use of such information can further 
enrich our understanding of VC decision making and therefore may be an important venue for 
future research.  
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